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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

Here is the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission into the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Two thorough Dissenting Statements accompany the final report. The report is a chronological compendium of the review of millions of pages of documents, the interviews of hundreds of leaders, CxOs, financial experts and academics, as well as common people, home- and business-owners who were also significantly affected by the financial meltdown. - Summary by Mario Pineda

Genre(s): Business & Economics

Language: English

Section	Chapter	Reader	Time
Play 00	Preface	Joanne Turner	00:08:03
Play 01	Conclusions of the Commission	Joanne Turner	00:38:05
Play 02	Conclusions of the Commission, concluded	Joanne Turner	00:22:59
Play 03	Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1	Joanne Turner	00:38:26
Play 04	Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2	Joanne Turner	00:45:54
Play 05	Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3	Joanne Turner	00:17:57
Play 06	Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos	Joanne Turner	00:30:09
Play 07	Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis	Joanne Turner	00:18:16
Play 08	Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac	Joanne Turner	00:20:26
Play 09	Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance	Joanne Turner	00:12:11
Play 10	Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives	Joanne Turner	00:25:53
Play 11	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities	Joanne Turner	00:19:24
Play 12	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management	Joanne Turner	00:12:00
Play 13	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash	Joanne Turner	00:12:11
Play 14	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance	Joanne Turner	00:13:26
Play 15	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth	Joanne Turner	00:08:47
Play 16	Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization	Joanne Turner	00:17:04
Play 17	Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending	Joanne Turner	00:06:19
Play 18	Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil	Joanne Turner	00:05:33
Play 19	Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators	Joanne Turner	00:19:20
Play 20	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force	Joanne Turner	00:19:39
Play 21	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium	Joanne Turner	00:18:12
Play 22	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny	Joanne Turner	00:04:42
Play 23	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending	Joanne Turner	00:12:52
Play 24	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position	Joanne Turner	00:04:02
Play 25	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention"	Joanne Turner	00:10:44
Play 26	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"	Joanne Turner	00:05:45
Play 27	Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6	Joanne Turner	00:01:18
Play 28	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity	Joanne Turner	00:10:21
Play 29	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan	Joanne Turner	00:32:56
Play 30	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit	Joanne Turner	00:06:49
Play 31	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product	Joanne Turner	00:17:23
Play 32	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check	Joanne Turner	00:16:09
Play 33	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace	Joanne Turner	00:13:09
Play 34	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7	Joanne Turner	00:03:24
Play 35	Ch. 8. The CDO Machine	Joanne Turner	00:07:50
Play 36	Ch. 8. We Created the Investor	Joanne Turner	00:22:21
Play 37	Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function	Joanne Turner	00:10:33
Play 38	Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest	Joanne Turner	00:10:51
Play 39	Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street	Joanne Turner	00:10:28
Play 40	Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime	Joanne Turner	00:17:16
Play 41	Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy	Joanne Turner	00:18:33
Play 42	Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess	Joanne Turner	00:19:27
Play 43	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8	Joanne Turner	00:02:55
Play 44	Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"	Joanne Turner	00:15:00
Play 45	Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments	Joanne Turner	00:22:31
Play 46	Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory	Joanne Turner	00:24:27
Play 47	Regulators: markets will always self-correct	Joanne Turner	00:14:56
Play 48	Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance	Joanne Turner	00:11:08
Play 49	Lehman: From Moving to Storage	Joanne Turner	00:07:47
Play 50	Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices	Joanne Turner	00:11:36
Play 51	2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool	Joanne Turner	00:12:30
Play 52	Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals	Joanne Turner	00:17:05
Play 53	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9	Joanne Turner	00:01:39
Play 54	Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"	Joanne Turner	00:09:52
Play 55	Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"	Joanne Turner	00:24:17
Play 56	Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"	Joanne Turner	00:18:04
Play 57	AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"	Joanne Turner	00:08:42
Play 58	Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"	Joanne Turner	00:12:28
Play 59	Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"	Joanne Turner	00:07:29
Play 60	Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"	Joanne Turner	00:23:34
Play 61	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10	Joanne Turner	00:02:20
Play 62	Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"	Joanne Turner	00:29:56
Play 63	Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"	Joanne Turner	00:08:04
Play 64	Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"	Joanne Turner	00:04:50
Play 65	Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"	Joanne Turner	00:10:10
Play 66	Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"	Joanne Turner	00:13:22
Play 67	Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11	Joanne Turner	00:02:33
Play 68	Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries	Joanne Turner	00:07:02
Play 69	Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive	Joanne Turner	00:13:59
Play 70	Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds	Joanne Turner	00:16:01
Play 71	Rating Agencies	Joanne Turner	00:04:27
Play 72	AIG: Well Bigger	Joanne Turner	00:07:39
Play 73	Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12	Joanne Turner	00:00:56
Play 74	Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro	Cbteddy	00:02:06
Play 75	Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"	Cbteddy	00:05:42
Play 76	Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"	Cbteddy	00:08:29
Play 77	Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"	Cbteddy	00:04:40
Play 78	Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"	Cbteddy	00:04:04
Play 79	Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"	Cbteddy	00:06:19
Play 80	Commission conclusions on Chapter 13	Cbteddy	00:01:39
Play 81	Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)	Mario Pineda	00:02:42
Play 82	Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"	Mario Pineda	00:11:50
Play 83	Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"	Mario Pineda	00:22:26
Play 84	Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"	Mario Pineda	00:32:30
Play 85	Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"	Mario Pineda	00:07:47
Play 86	Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"	Mario Pineda	00:09:16
Play 87	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14	Mario Pineda	00:01:15
Play 88	Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)	Cbteddy	00:03:48
Play 89	Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"	Cbteddy	00:04:06
Play 90	Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"	Cbteddy	00:03:56
Play 91	Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"	Cbteddy	00:09:15
Play 92	Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"	Cbteddy	00:11:06
Play 93	Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"	Cbteddy	00:04:42
Play 94	Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"	Cbteddy	00:02:49
Play 95	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15	Cbteddy	00:01:16
Play 96	Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)	Mario Pineda	00:02:38
Play 97	Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"	Mario Pineda	00:08:36
Play 98	Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"	Mario Pineda	00:05:16
Play 99	Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"	Mario Pineda	00:07:39
Play 100	Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"	Mario Pineda	00:07:12
Play 101	Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"	Mario Pineda	00:26:35
Play 102	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16	Mario Pineda	00:01:19
Play 103	Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)	Cbteddy	00:03:28
Play 104	Ch 17 "A good time to buy"	Cbteddy	00:05:04
Play 105	Ch 17 "The only game in town"	Cbteddy	00:03:30
Play 106	Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"	Cbteddy	00:06:38
Play 107	Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"	Cbteddy	00:03:58
Play 108	Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"	Cbteddy	00:08:45
Play 109	Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"	Cbteddy	00:06:22
Play 110	Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"	Cbteddy	00:07:31
Play 111	Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"	Cbteddy	00:03:37
Play 112	Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"	Cbteddy	00:01:16
Play 113	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17	Cbteddy	00:02:26
Play 114	Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)	Mario Pineda	00:04:37
Play 115	Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"	Mario Pineda	00:07:17
Play 116	Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"	Mario Pineda	00:03:38
Play 117	Ch 18 "Spook the market"	Mario Pineda	00:11:07
Play 118	Ch 18 "Imagination hat"	Mario Pineda	00:08:19
Play 119	Ch 18 "Heads of family"	Mario Pineda	00:03:38
Play 120	Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"	Mario Pineda	00:03:20
Play 121	Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"	Mario Pineda	00:08:02
Play 122	Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"	Mario Pineda	00:03:48
Play 123	Ch 18 "A calamity"	Mario Pineda	00:12:42
Play 124	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18	Mario Pineda	00:02:30
Play 125	Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)	Cbteddy	00:05:14
Play 126	Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"	Cbteddy	00:06:56
Play 127	Ch 19 "Spillover effect"	Cbteddy	00:10:50
Play 128	Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"	Cbteddy	00:05:18
Play 129	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19	Cbteddy	00:03:07
Play 130	Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)	Mario Pineda	00:07:45
Play 131	Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"	Mario Pineda	00:10:36
Play 132	Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"	Mario Pineda	00:13:07
Play 133	Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"	Mario Pineda	00:06:26
Play 134	Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"	Mario Pineda	00:04:16
Play 135	Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"	Mario Pineda	00:18:26
Play 136	Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"	Mario Pineda	00:18:03
Play 137	Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"	Mario Pineda	00:10:19
Play 138	Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"	Mario Pineda	00:11:15
Play 139	Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"	Mario Pineda	00:13:17
Play 140	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20	Mario Pineda	00:02:45
Play 141	Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)	Cbteddy	00:04:17
Play 142	Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"	Cbteddy	00:12:15
Play 143	Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"	Cbteddy	00:09:54
Play 144	Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"	Cbteddy	00:05:09
Play 145	Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"	Cbteddy	00:08:06
Play 146	Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"	Cbteddy	00:03:18
Play 147	Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"	Mario Pineda	00:06:39
Play 148	Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"	Mario Pineda	00:06:37
Play 149	Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"	Mario Pineda	00:05:39
Play 150	Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"	Mario Pineda	00:05:26
Play 151	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22	Mario Pineda	00:01:01
Play 152	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro	Cbteddy	00:01:19
Play 153	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others?	Cbteddy	00:07:09
Play 154	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis	Cbteddy	00:02:26
Play 155	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis	Cbteddy	00:06:10
Play 156	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy	Cbteddy	00:08:30
Play 157	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble	Cbteddy	00:08:35
Play 158	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets	Cbteddy	00:07:28
Play 159	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed	Cbteddy	00:09:32
Play 160	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure	Cbteddy	00:13:52
Play 161	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic	Cbteddy	00:06:39
Play 162	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing	Cbteddy	00:03:50
Play 163	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro	Mario Pineda	00:23:30
Play 164	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary	Mario Pineda	00:07:41
Play 165	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages	Mario Pineda	00:15:59
Play 166	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects	Mario Pineda	00:13:03
Play 167	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages	Mario Pineda	00:04:20
Play 168	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS	Mario Pineda	00:07:58
Play 169	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis?	Mario Pineda	00:17:17
Play 170	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion	Mario Pineda	00:04:40
Play 171	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro	Cbteddy	00:03:26
Play 172	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system	Cbteddy	00:03:21
Play 173	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin	Cbteddy	00:34:12
Play 174	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro	Cbteddy	00:09:00
Play 175	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role	Cbteddy	00:07:34
Play 176	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards	Cbteddy	00:35:58
Play 177	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1	Mario Pineda	00:27:41
Play 178	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2	Mario Pineda	00:28:32
Play 179	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages	Mario Pineda	00:10:15
Play 180	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing	Mario Pineda	00:05:10
Play 181	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act	Mario Pineda	00:22:13
Play 182	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion	Mario Pineda	00:02:37

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The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report