The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Final Report, Volume 1

Columbia Accident Investigation Board

In 1981, Columbia became the first spacecraft of its type to fly in Earth orbit and successfully completed 27 missions over more than two decades. During the STS-107 mission, Columbia and its crew traveled more than six million miles in 16 days. The Orbiterʼs destruction, just 16 minutes before scheduled touchdown, shows that space flight is still far from routine. It involves a substantial element of risk, which must be recognized, but never accepted with resignation. The seven Columbia astronauts believed that the risk was worth the reward. The Board salutes their courage and dedicates this report to their memory. - Summary from the Board Report

Note: Volumes 2-6 are supporting documents and transcripts not included in this recording.

Genre(s): Modern (20th C), Transportation

Language: English

Group: United States Government Reports

Section Chapter Reader Time
Play 01 Cover Explanation, In Memoriam, Board Statement MaryAnn
00:11:47
Play 02 Executive Summary, Report Synopsis MaryAnn
00:22:54
Play 03 An Introduction to the Space Shuttle, An Introduction to NASA Availle
00:21:50
Play 04 Pt 1: The Accident Ch 1: The Evolution of the Space Shuttle Program Availle
00:35:20
Play 05 Ch 2a: Columbia's Final Flight, part 1 Maria Kasper
00:32:27
Play 06 Ch 2b: Columbia's Final Flight, part 2 Maria Kasper
00:32:50
Play 07 Ch 2c: Columbia's Final Flight, part 3 Maria Kasper
00:29:21
Play 08 Mission Control Center Communications Roger Melin
00:20:44
Play 09 Ch 3a: Accident Analysis, part 1 Norman Elfer
00:28:15
Play 10 Foam Fracture Under Hydrostatic Pressure Doug Sheppard
00:09:34
Play 11 Ch 3b: Accident Analysis, part 2 JudyDerby
00:20:57
Play 12 Ch 3c: Accident Analysis, part 3 Patrick McHaffie
00:29:55
Play 13 Ch 3d: Accident Analysis, part 4 Patrick McHaffie
00:48:50
Play 14 Ch 3e: Accident Analysis, part 5 Patrick McHaffie
00:29:51
Play 15 Ch 3f: Accident Analysis, part 6 Patrick McHaffie
00:27:57
Play 16 Ch 4a: Other Factors Considered, part 1 TriciaG
00:29:55
Play 17 Ch 4b: Other Factors Considered, part 2 TriciaG
00:30:47
Play 18 Pt 2: Why the Accident Occurred, Ch 5a: From Challenger to Columbia, part 1 Maria Kasper
00:41:13
Play 19 Ch 5b: From Challenger to Columbia, part 2 Maria Kasper
00:34:13
Play 20 Ch 5c: From Challenger to Columbia, part 3 Maria Kasper
00:37:41
Play 21 Ch 6a: Decision Making at NASA, part 1 Patrick McHaffie
00:41:22
Play 22 Ch 6b: Decision Making at NASA, part 2 Maria Kasper
00:27:14
Play 23 Ch 6c: Decision Making at NASA, part 3 Maria Kasper
00:35:34
Play 24 Ch 6d: Decision Making at NASA, part 4 Maria Kasper
00:24:20
Play 25 Ch 6e: Decision Making at NASA, part 5 Maria Kasper
00:27:31
Play 26 Ch 6f: Decision Making at NASA, part 6 Maria Kasper
00:27:05
Play 27 Ch 6g: Decision Making at NASA, part 7 Maria Kasper
00:34:29
Play 28 Ch 6h: Decision Making at NASA, part 8 Maria Kasper
00:36:50
Play 29 Ch 6i: Decision Making at NASA, part 9 Maria Kasper
00:09:38
Play 30 Ch 7a: The Accident's Organizational Causes, part 1 Norman Elfer
00:35:01
Play 31 Ch 7b: The Accident's Organizational Causes, part 2 Norman Elfer
00:31:36
Play 32 Ch 7c: The Accident's Organizational Causes, part 3 TriciaG
00:41:09
Play 33 Ch 8a: History As Cause: Columbia and Challenger, part 1 Richard Shipp
00:28:46
Play 34 Ch 8b: History As Cause: Columbia and Challenger, part 2 Richard Shipp
00:34:50
Play 35 Pt 3: A Look Ahead, Ch 9: Implications for the Future of Human Space Flight TriciaG
00:35:02
Play 36 Ch 10a: Other Significant Observations, part 1 Mark Chulsky
00:33:07
Play 37 Ch 10b: Other Significant Observations, part 2 Mark Chulsky
00:49:47
Play 38 Ch 11: Recommendations Doug Sheppard
00:13:26