Completed chapters are marked in this color.

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41 of 41 (100%) sections assigned

41 of 41 (100%) sections completed

This project has a dedicated proof-listener who will listen to all sections: lubee930

Section	Title	Reader	Notes	Listen Url	Status
0	Preface	Caspian			PL OK
1	I.I - Concerning the nature of the will	Caspian			PL OK
2	I.II - Concerning the determination of the Will	Caspian			PL OK
3	I.III - Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, etc.; and of Contingence	neecheelok70			PL OK
4	I.IV - Of the distinction of natural and moral necessity and inability	neecheelok70			PL OK
5	I.V - Concerning the notion of liberty, and of moral agency	neecheelok70			PL OK
6	II.I - Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of liberty of will, consisting in the will's self-determining power	neecheelok70			PL OK
7	II.II - Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered	neecheelok70			PL OK
8	II.III - Whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its existence	neecheelok70			PL OK
9	II.IV - Whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul	neecheelok70			PL OK
10	II.V - Showing, that if the things asserted in these evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the cause of Arminian liberty; and how (this being the state of the case) Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently	neecheelok70			PL OK
11	II.VI - Concerning the will's determining in things which are perfectly indifferent, in the view of the mind	neecheelok70			PL OK
12	II.VII - Concerning the notion of liberty of will consisting in indifference	neecheelok70			PL OK
13	II.VIII - Concerning the supposed liberty of the will, as opposite to all necessity	neecheelok70			PL OK
14	II.IX - Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understanding	neecheelok70			PL OK
15	II.X - Volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives; with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings, about the freedom of the will	neecheelok70			PL OK
16	II.XI - The evidence of God's certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents	neecheelok70			PL OK
17	II.XII - God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions, as is without all necessity	neecheelok70			PL OK
18	II.XIII - Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with anything antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty	neecheelok70			PL OK
19	III.I - God's moral excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy	neecheelok70			PL OK
20	III.II - The acts of the will of the human soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, etc.	neecheelok70			PL OK
21	III.III - The case of such as are given up of god to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral necessity and inability to be consistent with blameworthiness	neecheelok70			PL OK
22	III.IV - Command, and obligation to obedience, consistent with moral inability to obey	neecheelok70			PL OK
23	III.V - That sincerity of desires and endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the nonperformance of things in themselves good, particularly considered	neecheelok70			PL OK
24	III.VI - Liberty of indifference, not only not necessary to virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of liberty and moral agency	neecheelok70			PL OK
25	III.VII - Arminian notions of moral agency inconsistent with all influence of motive and inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions	neecheelok70			PL OK
26	IV.I - The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but their nature	neecheelok70			PL OK
27	IV.II - The falseness and inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of action, and agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of the arminian doctrine concerning liberty, moral agency, etc.	neecheelok70			PL OK
28	The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.	neecheelok70			PL OK
29	IV.IV - It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to suppose moral necessity to be consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment	neecheelok70			PL OK
30	IV.V - Concerning those objections, that this scheme of necessity renders all means and endeavors for the avoiding of sin, or the obtaining virtue and holiness, vain, and to no purpose; and that it makes men no more than mere machines in affairs of morality and religion	neecheelok70			PL OK
31	IV.VI - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the stoical doctrine of fate, and the opinions of Mr. Hobbes	neecheelok70			PL OK
32	IV.VII - Concerning the necessity of the divine will	neecheelok70			PL OK
33	IV.VIII - Some further objections against the moral necessity of god's volitions considered	neecheelok70			PL OK
34	IV.IX - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes god the author of sin	neecheelok70			PL OK
35	IV.X - Concerning sin's first entrance into the world	neecheelok70			PL OK
36	IV.XI - Of a supposed inconsistence of these principles, with God's moral character	neecheelok70			PL OK
37	IV.XII - Of a supposed tendency of these principles to atheism and licentiousness	neecheelok70			PL OK
38	IV.XIII - Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supported, that it is metaphysical and abstruse	neecheelok70			PL OK
39	Conclusion	neecheelok70			PL OK
40	Appendix	neecheelok70			PL OK